NSC-68 represented a departure point for what would be the political attitude towards the communist phenomenon during the Cold War. While pointing out the imminence of the threat the U.S.S.R. posed, by describing its political structures in terms completely opposed to the U.S. system of politics, the secret document also presented four various courses of action possible in the confrontation with the U.S.S.R. These were the "continuation of current policies, with current and currently projected programs for carrying out these policies; isolation; war; a more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world" (NSC-68, 1950).
While the first options were argued and dismissed, the last one represented in the view of the document "the only course which is consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop" (NSC-68, 1950). Gaddis argues in respect to the actual implications of the NSC-68 that it was in fact a strategy plan. He views the initiative as "to suggest a way to increase defense expenditures without war, without long-term budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdens" (1982, 93). Although the president resisted the initial proposal, due to the fact that it implied an enormous increase in the defense budget, the Korean War proved to be the perfect situation to demonstrate the possible intentions of the U.S.S.R. In terms of spreading communism.
The Russian support for the North Korean invasion of the South of the peninsula drew the attention...
From this point-of-view, while in the beginning president Truman was reluctant to endorse the proposal due to the possible budgetary strains such an act would create, following the unfolding events in the Korean peninsula, Truman decided to get involved in the war by supervising the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 Parallel, thus making a clear statement of the position of the American diplomacy in relation to the communist threat.
The Korean War proved essential for the start of the Cold War because it marked the emergence of a monolithic communist bloc, formed by the Russians, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. At the same time, the NSC-68 proved to be essential in pointing out the way in which the U.S. can actually deal with the communist threat and represented a practical expression of the political strategy of containment. The increase in military expenditure also gave the start to the arms race, an important element of the overall conduct of the Cold War.
References
Calvocoressi, Peter. (1987). World politics since 1945. New York: Longman.
Gaddis, John Lewis. (1982). Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kissinger, Henry. (1995). Diplomacy. London: Simon & Schuster.
NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. (April 14, 1950). A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950. Retrieved 7 December 2007, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-9.htm
Nye, Joseph. (2005). Understanding international conflicts: an introduction to theory and history. New York: Pearson.
